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Metheringham




METHERINGHAM: Military Landing Ground later aerodrome
 

Military users: RAF Bomber Command          5 Group

106 & 467 (RAAF) Sqdns      (Avro Lancasters)

1690 (B) DFT    (Vickers-Supermarine Spitfires)
 

Location: E of B1189, NE of Linwood Grange, 9nm SE of Lincoln

Period of operation: Used in 1939 as a LG. Full aerodrome status: 1943 to 1946

 

Runways: 01/19   1829x46   hard           06/24   1280x46   hard
                12/30   1280x46   hard

 

NOTES: Listed as an operational bomber base in late 1944 with only 852 RAF personnel plus 342 WAAFs on station. ‘Loop’ hard-standings for 36 bombers.



SOME COMMENTS
To pick a typical Bomber Command station with which to make these over-riding remarks is impossible, so I’ve picked METHERINGHAM at random. I would most strongly recommend reading ‘Men of Air’ by Kevin Wilson. I doubt any one book describes so well the situation RAF Bomber Command aircrews went through.

I found it really quite hard to keep on reading at times, learning about the surely often needless slaughter the ‘Bomber Boys’ had to endure. It has become a popular fiction that it was all down to the egotistical ambitions of Bomber Command’s chief, ‘Bomber Harris’ which he brought about in a vain attempt to realise his ill thought out ambitions. In fact, it now appears, that the instruction to commence area bombing came from the British government, after taking legal advice on the matter, and Harris had the job to see it through – which he did with great enthusiasm.


WITH HINDSIGHT
I do of course realise that hindsight is a wonderful commodity, but time and time again Harris sent his squadrons across to Germany in conditions, and on routes, and in patterns, virtually guaranteed to inflict maximum casualties on his own forces. However, it must be realised that although approving the targets and strategy, the actual detailed planning of these raids was the work of senior officers under his command – and it is to those people we now need to look at very closely indeed. Who exactly were these people and what qualifications did they have to conduct this work? And indeed, what was their background and, if any, their political history?

On some raids, to Berlin and Nuremburg for example, it has given me cause to consider if these planners were actually colluding with the Nazi regime on a massive back-hander! Just broaching such an opinion will upset a great many people, but, the facts (or should I say records?) are plain enough to see that a lot of questions still need to asked, even sixty or more years on.


WERE THEY REALLY INCOMPTENT?
As said, perhaps the truth lies in seriously investigating those who made up the senior staff in Bomber Command and the Air Ministry. The often utterly inept and incompetent way, (or perhaps deliberate way?). they went about so many raids almost defies imagination today. What is more, it is now on record that the crews, especially the more experienced crews, as often as not realised this!

And yet, they ‘strapped themselves in’ and still took-off, night after night after night. Some were told when arriving for duty after training at HCUs, “You’re on an operational squadron now, your life expectancy is six weeks. Go to your billet and make out your will.”

A poll in a PoW camp revealed the average amount of sorties for Bomber crews before being shot down was….SIX!



A PROGANDA EXERCISE?
In other words a great many of these airmen knew damned well they were on the next best thing to suicide missions. And to think, so much propaganda was expended after the war to make us believe only the fanatical Japanese promoted such ideas! We now know programmes were devised to ‘shame’ Japanese pilots to undertake Kamikaze missions. I now think a somewhat similar regime existed within RAF Bomber Command?

On the basis of; “It’s up to you to save us and this country.”



A PRICE WORTH PAYING?
In this respect the message was correct of course. Without any doubt the damage done by Bomber Command was a major factor in winning the war. The cost in lives lost I’m now certain was far too high. But, that was the military way of doing things wasn’t it?



FIDO
Kevin Wilson also mentions that METHERINGHAM was one of several RAF Stations to have FIDO installed for fog dispersal to allow returning aircraft to land. Very simply this consisted of running two petrol lines, (or troughs) alongside the runway sides and setting fire to them, the huge amount of heat generated lifting the fog. A pipeline was run out to rail petrol tankers in a nearby siding and it appears the idea worked rather well. Mind you, I expect the aircrews had mixed feelings about this arrangement? Especially when it was often hard for them to determine if any damage from flak or German fighters might have affected the undercarriage, hydraulic system or punctured a tyre etc with an almost inevitable ground loop.

 

 

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