Scampton
SCAMPTON: Military aerodrome later ‘V’ bomber air base
Note: First picture by the author and taken through perspex. The smudge of red line on the main apron (mid left) is the Red Arrows. The second picture (2008) was obtained from Google Earth ©
The third so evocative picture was scanned from The Story Of Aircraft by David Charles, published in 1974. It could have been taken at any RAF base operating Lancasters, but it seems fitting to include it here.
Military users: WW1: RFC/RAF
33 Sqdn (BE.2s, FE.2s later Bristol F.2Bs)
No 49 Reserve Sqdn
Interwar years: 49 & 83 Sqdns (Handley Page Hampdens)
148 Sqdn (Hawker Audaxes, Handley Page Heyfords & Vickers Wellesleys)
214 Sqdn (Handley Page Harrows)
WW2: RAF Bomber Command 1 Group
83 Sqdn (Handley Page Hampdens later Avro Manchesters)
49 Sqdn (Hampdens, Manchesters later Avro Lancasters)
57, 153, & 625 Sqdns (Lancasters)
617 & 618 Sqdns (Highly modified Lancasters)
I now have no idea where and when I acquired this old and battered photograph, probably at a stall during an airshow. Presumably taken by an amateur as the original is nowhere near as sharp as my 'doctored' image - but what a fabulous picture - nostalgia doesn't get much better.
A note in pencil on the back states: "Scampton 1960s Lancaster NX711 Now at East Kirby of 'Two farmers' fame" However, it appears the Lancaster at East KirKby is NX611.
I always try to double check information before making an entry, and this revealed a very different story. So - which one is correct? On balance I think, for example, that the Wikipedia entry is probably best, especially as it reveals a thumping good additional aspect. It now appears that this Lancaster is R5868 and served as a 'Gate Guardian' at SCAMPTON from the 1950s until being dismantled in November 1970. It is now on display at the RAF Museum HENDON.
The additional aspect is that when the main road had to be widened the Lancaster had to be moved, along with the bombs on display. Moving the 'Grand Slam' proved to be a problem due to its great weight - ten tonnes - the most powerful non-atomic bomb used during WW2. Whilst efforts to move it were underway some bright spark realised the bomb was still active!
Needless to say it had to be transported to a safe place before being destroyed. I wonder how the transport crew felt, given this task?
Post 1945: USAF 77th Bomber Squadron (Boeing B-29 Superfortress)
10 & 21 Sqdns (English Electric Canberras)
18 Sqdn (Canberras, later Vickers Valiants)
27 Sqdn (Canberras & Avro Vulcans)
83 Sqdn (Avro Vulcans)
617 Squadron (Avro Vulcans)
1972 to (?) Strike Command Bombing School
1066 Sqdn (Handley Page Hastings later HS Dominies for navigator training)
230 OCU (Vulcans)
Note: When the Bomber Command Bombing School was merged with 230 OCU and the Hastings arrived equipped with the H2S radar carried in Vulcans during the late 1970s, navigators also destined for the Handley Page Victor, Blackburn Buccaneer and the McDonnell Douglas Phantom were also trained here.
CFS [Central Flying School] (Beagle Bulldogs, Westland Gazelles, BA Hawks, Hunting-Percival Jet Provosts & Short Tocanos)
TMTS (Hawker Hunters)
643 VGS (Volunteer Gliding Squadron)
Red Arrows (BA Hawks)
A GALLERY IN SEPTEMBER 2018
(Pictures by the editor)
Note: The fourth picture, (all four taken on Saturday the 1st September), shows several light aircraft. Some sort of private event involving aerobatics was taking place.
Location: W of A15, E of Scampton village, 5nm N of Lincoln
Period of operation: 1916 to -
Runways: WW2: Grass runways until mid 1943 at least? The ‘Dambusters’ raid which took place on the night of 16th/17th May 1943 took off from a grass runway.
The hard runways were added, it seems, in late 1943.
Later in WW2: 05/23 1829x46 hard 01/19 1280x46 hard
11/29 1280x46 hard
2001: 05/23 2740x46 hard
NOTES: Perhaps an indication of how utterly useless Bomber Command was when WW2 was declared can be illustrated by the Handley Page Heyfords then based here. They couldn’t even get to Germany and back! Even in Sepember 1938, according to John Sweetman in his excellent book Bomber Crew - when HP Heyford crews ‘stood by’ to attack the Ruhr - they were advised to bale out over Holland on the way back! (Mr Sweetman doesn’t name the base the Heyford crews were actually based at, but SCAMPTON fits the bill and is probably as good as any?)
Against this background the Air Ministry were very pro-active in developing aids to enable aircrews to land back at base safely. To quote from the authors of ‘TOLLERTON, an airfield for Nottingham’: “The Air Ministry had conducted trials with several systems to find an effective and reliable Semi Blind Approach (SBA) landing system, none of which proved to be really satisfactory. At this point the British company Standard Telephones and Cables (STC) of New Southgate, London, stepped in with a proposal that the Air Ministry simply could not turn down. STC’s German sister company, C. Lorenz AG, was manufacturing a radio beam approach system that STC would supply free of charge for the Air Ministry to evaluate.”
Just as a point to demonstrate how easily the picture about history can be difficult to grasp; when this was happening the anti-semitic Nazi Party in Germany had been pretty much set in place. In fact the first anti-Semitic declaration from the then newly formed Nazi party was in 1920. The first major anti-Jewish Law was passed in 1933 and during the 1935 Nuremburg Rally the intent to persecute Jews was made official. The extermination phase came later during WW2. The ‘writing was on the wall’ and widely known and Jews were emigrating to the UK (and elsewhere of course) in ever increasing numbers. Set against attitudes today it is claimed that the U.K. admitted more Jewish refugees than any other country in the world during the run up to WW2. On the other hand the Nazi Party were applauded for holding the Olympic Games in 1936.
“The trials were reasonably successful and in March 1937 the Air Ministry gave a contract to STC worth £340,000 to begin implementing the new system. However, the original German equipment was redesigned to use components manufactured in Great Britain. Once this had been done installation of the new system, renamed Standard Beam Approach (SBA), began at RAF Scampton in September 1937.”
I mention this to illustrate that politics and commercial expediency often make very very odd ‘bedfellows’ which can be quite bewildering to understand by simple folk such as myself. This said it certainly seems to indicate that the German authorities, at that time, did not see the United Kingdom as a potential enemy? Indeed, it is often recorded that Hitler viewed the UK as being a natural ally in the early years when the Nazi Party was gaining power, not least because our Royal family were fundamentally of German extraction.
GETTING A HANDLE ON THINGS
As pointed out elsewhere many of the RAF ‘top brass’ were in those days, could when seen today by modern standards, be easily regarded as mostly “barking mad”. For example: Why plan a raid from SCAMPTON when a raid from the nearest point, from an airfield in a more eastern point in Norfolk or Suffolk for example, would surely have had a much better chance of success? The ‘still air’ maximum range of the Heyford was given as 920 miles - presumably loaded? The direct line distance to Essen in the Ruhr from SCAMPTON is about 350 miles. But, the Heyford cruise speed was only about 130 mph? Therefore any head or crosswinds would seriously reduce the range and with our prevailing winds in the UK being sou-westerly, this would invariably be the case. But, either way the figures still don’t add up.
From any airfield in the east of Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex or Kent the distance to Essen, (with its massive Krupp engineering works), would be pretty much the same, about 225 to 250 miles. Easily in range. But no, the RAF top brass insisted that the majority of bombers should depart and return only to their base airfield in either Lincolnshire to South Yorkshire. So, exactly whose side were they on?
THE FIRST BOMBING RAID OF WW2
In 2014 I found this account by Patrick Bishop in his excellent book Wings: “For Bomber Command there was no Phoney War. It went into action on the day war was declared and on many days thereafter. The experience of battle was a painful one: there were virtually no successes. Instead, the crews received a succession of bruising lessons on how little they knew and how inadequate their aircraft were to the gigantic task that had been imagined for them.”
“The first raid set a pattern that was to become dismally familiar. Barely had Chamberlain’s voice faded than the men of ‘A’ Flight, 89 Squadron, based at Scampton in Lincolnshire, were told to prepare for a raid on the North Sea port of Wilhemshaven. The flurry of initial activity subsided as the take-off time was delayed. The men stood by their Hampden bombers, smoking and fretting. One pilot, with a reputation for cockiness, found his ‘hands were shaking so much that I could not hold them still. All the time we wanted to rush off to the lavatory. Most of us went four times an hour.” If nothing else a clear indication of the mindset those crews had.
Then I remembered learning that many RAF bomber aircrews, despite having a navigator, couldn’t really navigate, a few being so utterly incompetent they couldn’t even find the country their target was in. Presumably then, a long trip across the North Sea was out of the question for a few of them, unless they could tag along behind a more capable crew perhaps?
“Eventually, just after 6 p.m., six aircraft took off, climbed over the towers of Lincoln Cathedral, then headed out over the ridged, grey monotony of the North Sea. Their instructions were to attack pocket battleships believed to be lying in Wilhelmshaven Harbour. If they couldn’t locate the target they had permission to bomb an ammunition dump on the shore. Under no circumstances were they to risk hitting civilian housing or even dockyard buildings and there would be ‘serious repercussions’ if they did. Like Hitler, the British government was extremely wary of provoking reprisals if non-combatants were killed.” It is now rather surprising, is it not, to see how quickly that policy foundered.
“As they approached what they thought was the target, the cloud clamped down to a hundred feet. They had nothing to aim at apart from the muzzle flashes from anti-aircraft batteries firing blindly towards them through the murk. Squadron Leader Leonard Snaith, who was leading the attack, ordered them to turn back. They jettisoned their bombs in the sea and headed for home. The initial disappointment of the pilot whose earlier nerves had initiated so many trips to the loo gave way to the realization that this was the right decision. ‘For all we knew,’ he wrote, ‘we were miles off our course. The gun flashes ahead might have been the Dutch Islands or they might have been Heligoland.’
ANOTHER TAKE
In 2008, having flown from Kiel low along this coast in increasingly hazy, windy, rainy conditions skirting around large clumps of cloud often down to the deck; the main reason we decided to proceed to a diversion at Groningen-Eelde in The Netherlands to pick up fuel, (due to the increasingly strong headwind), was aided because navigation was so easy – if you can read a map just moderately well. Mind you, and to be fair, nobody was actually firing at us – as far as we could tell.
“They reached the Lincolnshire coast in darkness and touched down, tired and dispirited, at 10.30 p.m. ‘What a complete mess-up,’ recorded the pilot. ‘For all the danger we went through it couldn’t be called a raid, but we went through all the feelings.’ Mr Bishop then drops his bombshell: “The remarks were made by twenty-year-old Guy Gibson who led the Dams Raid to become one of the most famous air warriors of the age.”
A QUICK COMMENT ON THE DAM BUSTERS RAID
The ‘Dam-busters’ raid took place on the night of the 16/17th May 1943 and in many ways Guy Gibson’s career in Bomber Command mirrors the way in which the Command itself so quickly came of age. And, by that time, as Guy Gibson I’m positive would have happily agreed, the RAF then had many absolutely first-class navigators, some of whom he picked for 617 Squadron.
THE FOUR ENGINE BOMBER
What might not be so widely appreciated is that the Air Ministry specifications, P12/36 and P13/36, which resulted eventually in the three types of four-engine heavy bombers used by RAF Bomber Command, were being drawn up from 1935. If these far-sighted people had not been naround to do this work, the outcome of WW2 in Europe at least, would, without much doubt at all, have been very different.
It also seems to be largely forgotten or ignored that, even well after the D-Day landings and up to the closing stages, that bombers were the only means of attacking German cities and, especially, their war manufacturing capacity. Which incidentally, the so-called ‘neutral’ countries of Sweden, and Switzerland especially, were very happy indeed to supply Germany with essential war materials and equipment.
THE EARLY DAYS OF THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE
I have found researching RAF Bomber Command in WW2 especially interesting. For example, whilst the catastrophic ‘Battle of France’ was reaching its zenith, culminating in the rescue of 338,000 troops from the beaches of Dunkirk between the 27th May and 4th of June 1940, with quite appalling losses for Bomber Command undertaking daylight raids in a vain attempt to halt the German advance, Bomber Command had also started night bombing operations against targets inside Germany from England.
To quote from Bomber Crew by John Sweetman: “However, night operations had also begun inside Germany on 11/12 May, thirty-seven Hampdens and Whitleys attacked road and rail communications at Mönchen-Gladbach, the first bombing raid on German soil. Four aircraft were lost. Succeeding nights saw further raids on associated targets with few bomber losses. Ninety-nine Wellingtons, Whitleys and Hampdens set out for sixteen different locations in the Ruhr on 15/16 May. Eighty-one reported bombing their primary or alternative targets. No bomber was lost over Germany, although one crashed on the way back. Bearing in mind that twelve other bombers struck enemy lines of communication in Belgium that night, only one bomber was therefore lost out of 111. Successful raids on transportation centres in the immediate vicinity of the battlefield raised hopes of similar turmoil being caused in the German domestic railway sytem.”
I suppose this illustrates two major factors? The first being to reinforce in the minds of the RAF top brass in Bomber Command that night raids were very effective. The second being that the speed and scale with which the Germans established anti-aircraft batteries and night-fighter operations to counter this unexpected threat was very impressive. However, as revealed later, very few bombs dropped on the target and many were dropped many miles away in often open country. So in effect very little was being achieved.
John Sweetman adds another passage which I believe is very important indeed: “Basically, the idea for a night raid at this stage of the war was to stretch it over a long period to extend and exhaust the defences, a practice condemned by Harris as ‘vague’. Gibson illustrated its practical shortcomings when ordered to attack part of the Hamburg docks on 17 May 1940. At briefing, cautioned that the moon was in the south-west and the recommended line of approach therefore from the north-east, crews were told that they could attack from whichever height suited them. Moreover, they might fly in and out via any route they wished, so long as they bombed between midnight and 4 a.m. Incredibly, as Gibson and his navigator wanted to see a film in Lincoln that evening, they decided to take-off late and bomb after 3 a.m. Once airborne, planning to fly at 8000ft and bomb at 2000ft, Gibson found that his crew had not brought oxygen bottles with them.” The passage ends; ‘These early raids were haphazard.’
I fail to understand this last comment. Most people do not need oxygen unless flying above 10,000ft, and even then only if flying substantially above this level for extended periods. Most fairly fit people do not need oxygen for operating up to 15,000ft for roughly half an hour or more. Indeed pilots of light aircraft often circle the summit of the Matterhorn in Switzerland, (14,691ft), without any ill effects.
A DANGEROUS BUSINESS
Patrick Bishop in his excellent book Wings also makes this very important point: “Flying in a bomber was a very dangerous business and would be the most hazardous wartime activity open to British servicemen. Non-operational flying could be almost as lethal as facing the enemy. Of the 202 airmen killed in bombers between the start of the war and the two disasterous Wilhelmshaven missions, ninety-nine were killed while on training or ferry flights.”
What the RAF appears not have learnt from the Luftwaffe, was that small numbers of bombers against any target are ineffectual. What are needed is vast fleets and until ‘Bomber’ Harris came on the scene nothing Bomber Command achieved had any effect worth mentioning.
STATISTICS
In his fabulous book, Bomber Command, Max Hastings tells us this: "In September 1939, Britain entered the war with 608 first-line fighters against the 1,215 of the Luftwaffe, and 536 bombers against 2,130. But more important than mere numbers were the aircraft types on production and coming off the drawing board. It is impossible to overstate the significance of production policy decisions taken before the outbreak of war in both Britain and Germany, decisions that would have a decisive effect on the struggle in the air right through to 1945."
"Although the Luftwaffe achieved overwhelming superiority over the RAF in both quantity and quality in the mid-1930s, British designers were creating aircraft that Germany proved disastrously unable to match in 1942, 1943, even 1944. In 1936 the Air Staff issued specifications P13/36 and B/12/36 for four-engined heavy bombers and twin-engined 'heavy-medium ' bombers that brought into being , in 1941, the Stirling, the Halifax, the Manchester and its ultimate modification, the Lancaster."
"Whatever debate is possible about the proportion of national resources ultimately devoted to heavy-bomber production, and the manner in which the bomber force was employed, it is difficult to dispute the value to the British war effort of possessing heavy aircraft with capabilities no other nation could match, although the best brains in Germany struggled to do so."
It wasn't just in Germany either. Generally speaking the Avro Lancaster could carry twice the bomb load of the Boeing B-17 Fortress and the Consolidated B-24 Liberator. Something that certainly needs to be remembered.
THE BOMBER STREAM METHOD
It seems to me this was exactly the most incorrect and least effective way to bomb Germany. Especially after the quite brilliant ‘Pathfinder’ system had been implemented. They weren’t always ‘spot on’ but by far the best option we had.
It wouldn’t have taken much extra planning to have aircraft coming in over a prolonged period from various directions at various altitudes to bomb cities. It would be relatively simple to assign altitudes to time slots and vectors to help avoid collisions. Filling the sky with bombers coming from ‘all’ directions is a much more difficult task for night fighter squadrons to attack and makes it much more difficult for ack-ack batteries.
The bomber ‘stream’ system was, it can now easily be seen today, deliberately designed to maximise collisions, maximise chances of dropping bombs on other aircraft in the stream, and making it much, much easier for night fighters to attack, (shooting fish in a barrel seems an apt term), and giving more than enough time for ground defences to ‘get set up’. As said often enough elsewhere in this Guide, “On whose side were the top brass in Bomber Command actually on?”
I suppose we need to try and understand the mind-set. Flexibility wasn’t an option. A rigid procedure had to be decided on, set in place, cast in concrete, and executed despite it being a method obviously fatally flawed almost from the outset. Just as in WW1 of course. Keep throwing more troops at it, it’s bound to work eventually. And as well, virtually no procedures were set in place to allow those in 'the firing line' to contribute their findings and advice into 'The System'.
At least one example of a pilot re-training as a navigator in order to fly to the target away from the bomber stream has come to light. Obviously an individual who was highly intelligent. Being intelligent was definitely not a capacity sought by the RAF. Being fairly clever was certainly a key element the RAF appreciated, plus of course an unquestioning approach to authority.
There is another very important aspect to be considered. I have looked long and hard at bomber routes planned during the major bombing offensive of Germany. Almost without exception I could not have planned routes guaranteed to give every possible advantage to enemy night fighter attacks and ground based fire. Without any doubt therefore, I think an investigation into who exactly were planning these routes, and their known political affilliations and past history, now needs to be examined.
A BIT OF HISTORY
In 1943 the very famous 617 Squadron ‘Dam Busters’ were based here, commanded by Guy Gibson. He initially flew Hampden bombers here with 83 Squadron in 1940. The raid occurred on the night of the 16/17 May. There are many accounts of this most daring raid, which incidentally the CoC of Bomber Command, ‘Butcher’ Harris as called by his aircrews, (‘Bomber’ Harris as we now know him), was some say, much against, regarding it initially as utterly ridiculous. He was over-ruled. Being a WW1 pilot his approach to aerial warfare was mostly, it does seem, ‘Send them over the top in very large numbers’. On a similar principle he believed the ‘area bombing’ of German cities was the most effective deterrent, especially in the earlier bombing offensive. Without much doubt he was correct in one respect, the RAF could not usually bomb even a city as large as Berlin accurately until around 1943.
On the other hand it is perhaps hard to explain this view given that he must have seen that the German area bombing, (or Blitz), of British cities had if anything strengthened the resolve of the public to endure such attacks. It would appear he knew this, but also realised we had to hit them harder - much, much harder. It was of course – THE ONLY OPTION in 1941 and 1942. Although attempts were made to bomb specific targets such as aircraft factories etc, it was mostly a very chancy affair at best - especially when bombing by night. Some in charge wanted something very special to happen, to both elevate the RAF's abysmal bombing campaign record and also convince the USA that we now had a chance of winning the European war - and to convince them that they now needed to get involved.
THE 'DAM BUSTERS' RAID
We need to remember that so much depended on the success of this singular raid.
This said the famous ‘Dambusters’ raid was nowhere near as catastrophic as was intended, especially because the Sorpe dam hadn’t been breached, but as a PR exercise it was probably the finest example in WW2? Winston Churchill used it to great effect when addressing Congress in the USA to convince the Americans to support us in the war against the Nazi regime. Indeed, many believe this may well have been a tipping point, before the Americans woke up to the Soviet threat which could easily have overcome all of Europe - unless the USA put huge numbers of 'boots on the ground'.
Then again Barnes Wallis had advised the RAF about the minimum number of bombers needed to successfully breach the Sorpe dam, (which would have the greatest effect to disrupt industry in the Ruhr region) - and yet those in charge deliberately detailed less than this number - probably knowing, as happened, that only a fraction of those would survive the inbound flight to reach the target. So, in effect, certain senior RAF officers connived to make certain that the Sorpe would not be breached.
SOMETHING TO THINK ABOUT
In his biography George 'Johnny' Johnson has this to say about his role as bomb-aimer on the undefended Sorpe dam. "So, we had to deliver our Upkeep with pinpoint accuracy, from very low level, never having practised this method at all. During his part of the breifing, I am convinced that I heard Barnes Wallis say that it would take six bombs to crack the Sorpe. If we managed that, the water pressure would do the rest, splitting the dam open." The senior staff involved therefore decided to allot just three bombers to attack the Sorpe and only two succeeded - although only one bomb exploded.
Here again the ‘learnt’ history is now revealing some very disturbing aspects about this particular operation. As said elsewhere it now seems without much if any doubt that German sympathisers or under-cover ‘moles’ were involved in the senior planning regimes of RAF Bomber Command, to deliberately minimise the effects on Germany of the bombing campaign. Who these people were might never be discovered? Probably only because the sheer amount of time involved to analyse the evidence is not enough to expose them, and will never be afforded?
To many, even today, such an accusation will appear as outlandish, tantamount to heresy, and I would have shared such opinions until embarking on researching this ‘Guide’. Having decided to do so in some detail the chill realisation that other forces were at work became very apparent. But, first of all we have to dispense with the plethora of myth, legend and propaganda we’ve all been fed with over sixty years. To reveal the truth, perhaps above all the various accounts, the most useful has been the book Dambusters by Max Arthur. And, I would highly recommend reading 'The Last British Dambuster' a biography of George 'Johnny' Johnson.
It is very important to strictly view the facts. On this raid the priorities were the Möhne dam, then the Eder dam, then the Sorpe. A couple of other dams were included to be attacked if the opportunity arose by just one bomber - in effect a waste of space. The entire premise for this attack was to deprive the Ruhr region of the essential water to produce steel. So, why was the Eder dam the second priority? Very difficult to attack at night due to terrain issues, or even in the daytime, the Eder dam had no effect on the Ruhr industry. In fact the Germans placed so little importance was placed on it, it was not even defended. The Sorpe was the real prize, and, because it was very difficult indeed to approach, it also had no defences. And as said , the RAF senior staff decided on a deliberate strategy to keep it intact.
There is of course another issue, if a really decisive raid of German dams to disrupt the steel industry etc, why was such a small force chosen? Were only enough competent RAF Bomber Command airmen extent at that time to provide only one squadron? I think not.
IN CONCLUSION
Without any doubt whatsoever, the ‘Dambusters’ raid had been deliberately designed to inflict minimal damage. Indeed, the inward routes to be flown were ‘designed’ or contrived to inflict maximum casualties to the bomber crews. After the raids RAF Bomber Command made it absolutely certain that no attempt to hinder repairs were made. In fact every attempt to assist the Germans to repair these dams was accorded, not even high level bombing raids were carried out.
Does such a claim seem outlandish? In fact not at all. Max Arthur includes this surprising quote from, of all people, Albert Speer (German Minister of Armament and War production). Accepting the damage to the Möhne dam he had this to say; “The British had not succeeded, however, in destroying the other three resevoirs. Had they done so, the Ruhr Valley would have been almost completely deprived of water in the coming summer months. At the largest of the reservoirs, the Sorpe Valley reservoir, they did achieve a direct hit on the centre of the dam. I inspected it that same day. Fortunatey the bomb hole was slightly higher than the water level. Just a few inches lower – a small brook would have been transformed into a raging river which would have swept away the stone and eathern dam. That night, employing just a few bombers, the British came close to a success which would have been greater than anything they had achieved hitherto with a commitment of thousands of bombers.”
Although I am inclined to dismiss ‘conspiracy theory’ it does now appear likely that a faction within Bomber Command, dedicated to support the Nazi regime, had done some very good work here? If you accept this premise they had pretty much nullified the effects of a truly damaging attack in the first instance and kept up their good work afterwards. To continue the quote from Albert Speer, “But they made a single mistake which puzzles me to this day. They divided their forces and that same night destroyed the Eder Valley dam, although it had no nothing whatsoever to do with the supply of water to the Ruhr.” It was, it would now seem, a total waste of effort. So - who exactly decided to include this attack on this dam as a second priority?
If you still doubt the existence of Nazi ‘moles’ in the RAF, please read this, again from the account by Albert Speer. “A few days after this attack, seven thousand men whom I had ordered shifted from the Atlantic Wall to the Möhne and Eder areas, were hard at work repairing the dams. On the 23 Sepember 1943, in the nick of time before the beginning of the rains, the breach in the Möhne was closed. We were thus able to collect the precipitation of the late autumn and winter of 1943 for the needs of the following summer.”
For more proof of elements in the RAF dedicated to support the Nazi regime, again from Albert Speer, “While we were engaged in rebuilding, the British air force missed its second chance. A few bombs would have produced cave-ins at the exposed building sites, and a few fire bombs could have set the wooden scaffolding blazing.” It didn’t happen. An obviously ‘common sense’ strategy against the only dam attacked which could have had any measurable effect on the war effort, was then left unmolested! So, call me cynical, but yet again even more proof of a pro-Nazi factor in the senior sections of RAF planning? It would now be pretty hard to deny this surely?
It wasn’t just Albert Speer who was surprised that Bomber Command didn’t ram home the advantage on the Möhne dam, or then attack other dams which, if breached, would indeed have very seriously disrupted the industry in the Ruhr. Some aircrew members of 617 Squadron could not understand why this didn’t happen. Typically, (as in most bombing routes), the outward route was designed to make certain the maximum amount of casualties resulted before reaching the target. The shorter and safer route being allocated for the return flight. This is a matter of fact, not opinion; these routes were recorded and can been seen and easily evaluated.
Indeed, the order to fly at such a very low level was ‘designed’ to make certain that many of the crews did not get to the target. Navigating accurately at such a low level at night is incredibly difficult. It also appears that the difference between flying at 200ft and 500ft, or even 800ft makes very little difference to anti-aircraft crews if their guns can be lowered more or less to a horizontal position. For light arms fire it is a positive advantage. But, the risk of collision with electrical cables, industrial chimneys etc, is greatly increased.
Just to ram the point home Max Arthur gives this account by Sergeant George ‘Johnny’ Johnson who was a bomb-aimer. “In the first place we had a problem with our aeroplane. It mis-behaved on the run-up and we had to transfer to the reserve. Now the reserve had only arrived that afternoon. It had been fuelled, it had been bombed up, it had a compass swing – but that was it. It had been armed, so we had to transfer to that – which meant we were twenty minutes late taking off.” But - here’s the bit that catches my attention. “We went out on the reverse route because that way we felt we could catch up with the others who were so far ahead of us. The inward route was rather more distant than the homeward route, so we went out on the homeward route to cut the time.”
Time and time again you see this pattern emerging. When bombed up and heavy with fuel a longer and more dangerous outbound route was selected. Surely it is ‘high time’ to examine this wilful if not bizarre strategy and demand some explanations?
NOT AS SIMPLE AS IT MIGHT SEEM
There is now an opinion that the effects of the raid on the dams was actually far more reaching, by forcing the German’s to deflect resources away from southern Italy and strengthening the defensive positions in northern France. One source says that Rommel, when tasked with providing the defence of Normandy, was appalled to find that so little had been achieved. Because, so many ‘workers’ had been deflected to reinforce the dams. And yet, as said, those in command ordered that no attacks would be made during the reconstruction of the dams. It really does begger belief does it not?
THE TALL-BOY
618 Squadron, also based here, were tasked with attacking the Tirpitz with the smaller spherical ‘Highball’ and they used Scottish Lochs to practise on. That raid didn’t work but eventually, when Barnes-Wallis developed the ‘Tall-Boy’ they succeeded in sinking it. I really do find this obsession with sinking the Tirpitz interesting. It was seen as a massive threat…but why? Ever since the Bismarck was sunk the Germans kept it hidden away – and I reckon for a very good reason - as it was useless. As were all British battleships, quickly sunk by aerial bombardment as the war progressed.
THOSE FLYING SITES
In the spirit of celebrating flying sites in the widest sense, I suppose the dams used to practise for these raids might deserve a mention? These were: Group One - Lake Vyrnwy, Bala Lake and a reservoir 10 miles south-west of Denbigh. Group Two – Fewston 11 miles north of Bradford, Goatwater Resevoir 10 miles norty-north west of Fewston and Barnard Castle Resevoir. Group Three – Cropston Resevoir near Leicester, Thornton Resevoir also near Leicester and Blackbrook Resevoir near Loughborough. Many if not all of the crews thoroughly enjoyed these somewhat dangerous exercises as very low flying was normally strictly prohibited. Needless to say Bomber Command received several complaints, especially from irate farmers with livestock!
THE 'PR' EFFECT
It is said that these raids on the dams largely convinced the Americans, in an address Churchill gave in Washington, to back the British and use our island as a base to defeat the threat of Germany and join in with this war. They certainly shook the German High Command. However, regarding the American involvement many people today now believe that once the USA really got into gear with it’s war machine in Europe there seems little doubt their main concern was to put men on the ground, (hence the D-Day invasion), across Europe to prevent the Soviet invasion spreading westwards. Germany then being seen as a largely spent force doomed to be in retreat, albeit costly to defeat.
RE-WRITING HISTORY
In more recent years many people ignorant of history have started claiming the bombing campaign against Germany was excessive and unwarranted etc. What utter nonsense! The RAF have no responsibility whatsoever for even a single German life lost. Germany declared the war, started area bombing (total war) and reaped the consequences - it is as simple as that. The Nazi High Command were mostly in denial after the firestorm erupted in Hamburg in 1943, (not planned as such incidentally), and they should have ended the war then.
It was now clearly obvious the RAF alone could inflict massive damage and could continue to do so on city after city. Then the Americans joined in but still the Nazi Party wouldn’t confront the reality that defeat was inevitable. The quite appalling suffering of the German people after the Hamburg raid was wholly self-inflicted by their governing agency, the Nazi Party. Plus, as the devastating effects of the bombing campaign became increasingly 'effective' the Nazi Party started attacking the UK with first the V.1 flying bombs and then the 'terror' weapon the V.2. To which the Allies had no alternative but to hit Germany as hard as possible, time and time again. For example the dreadful attack on Dresden was fully justified, especially as the Russians had requested it in order to remove the German military stronghold based there.
THE 'COLD' WAR
This airfield later became perhaps the most famous of the ten primary British ‘V’ bomber bases? In 1975 the Vulcans were still the prime type operating here. But, another service was being provided by 27 Squadron flying Vulcans - this was MRR (Maritime Radar Reconaissance) - mostly searching the Atlantic for Soviet warships but also patrolling the North Sea oil rigs. Initially it appears their role was direct Buccaneers to hone in and photograph the Soviet vessels, but later it was decided the Vulcans could do this job alone.
A RECORD BREAKING FLIGHT
In late 1960, or thereabouts, 617 Squadron started to practice and rehearse for a record-breaking non-stop flight to Sydney in Australia with a Vulcan. This included becoming proficient at both air-to-air refuelling, and of course, the procedures for finding the tanker(s).
'Proof of concept' training flights stepped up from non-stop to Nairobi and back, then Karachi and back. Then, in June 1961, the record-breaking flight to Sydney commenced with air-to-air refuelling over Cyprus, Karachi and Singapore; a distance of about 11,500 miles taking twenty hours and three minutes. It appears that nine Vickers Valiant tankers from 214 Squadron RAF MARHAM provided the airborne support.
It seems interesting to note that in late 2016, Qantas announced that from March 2018, they intended to launch the first ever non-stop service from London to Perth, Australia using the Boeing 787 Dreamliner. Sydney is of course about 2035 miles further on to the east, but needless to say the 787 will not need air-to-air refuelling. Considering the truly massive advances made in aviation during the first fifty to sixty years of powered aviation, it has taken another sixty years to get this far.
But, as in all forms of technological advances, initial progress is invariably swift, and thereafter a huge amount of effort and expenditure is required to tweek further advantages. Mind you, in 2016, the normal flight time from London to Perth with one en route stop was around twenty hours so the gain in time isn't that great - and, what will the comparative cost be?
THE 'BATTLE OF BRITAIN FLIGHT' LANCASTER
I came across a mention that in 1977 the Avro Lancaster G-ASXX (NX611) of the H.A.P.S. was based here. From other records it really does seem that by then it was flying with the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight which moved from COLTISHALL to CONINGSBY in late 1976. What does appear the case is that crews converting to fly the Lancaster came here to get some four-engined piston experience with the last remaining Hastings squadron.
A DOG'S LIFE?
A report in Airfield Review in July 2006 stated that ‘Nigger’s’ grave was still being maintained in top condition. I think I can just hear a sharp intake of modern PC breath but ‘Nigger’ was a black Labrador, the pet dog of Guy Gibson who led the Dam Busters raid and somewhat immortalised I suppose in the B&W film of that raid. ‘Nigger’ was run over and killed outside SCAMPTON just before the ‘Dambusters’ raid took off.
I am very reluctant to attribute any airfield operating Lancasters to being the ‘classic’ Lancaster airfield, but if any was, I hope you will agree, SCAMPTON fits the bill for mentioning a few statistics for this type:
The tonnage of bombs dropped on enemy targets was 608,612 tons.
The number of incendiary bombs dropped on enemy targets was 51,513,106.
The average weight of bombs dropped per aircraft lost was 132 tons. For the Short Stirling it was 41 tons and the Handley Page Halifax 51 tons.
7,377 Lancasters were built and 3,346 were lost on operations.
Only 35 Lancasters completed 100 operational missions or more. The record was by the Lancaster III, serial number ED 888, which survived one hundred and forty ‘Ops’.
27 SQUADRON, THE COLD WAR
Very briefly the history of 27 Squadron when based at SCAMPTON amply illustrates the often quite remarkable transformations even a single RAF squadron can go through. Indeed, 27 Squadron was formed in 1915 at HOUNSLOW HEATH (LONDON) and disappeared abroad before being reformed in the UK at OAKINGTON (CAMBRIDGESHIRE) in 1945 flying Douglas Dakotas in a transport role. Exactly who said, “A change is as good as a rest?”
In 1953 27 Squadron reformed at SCAMPTON (for a ‘tour’ lasting thirty years) flying the bomber version of the English Electric Canberra, the B 2, and in 1961 became the first RAF squadron to be equipped with the Avro Vulcan B 2. Their job with the Vulcan in those days was to deliver nuclear bombs on the Soviet Union. Then, in 1973, the Vulcans were modified for MRR (Maritime Radar Reconnaissance) duties – a job they did until 1983, when, in that same year, they packed their bags and moved to MARHAM (NORFOLK) to fly the Panavia Tornado and went back to ostensibly bombing the Soviets with nuclear bombs.
To round the story off, 27 Squadron ended up at ODIHAM (HAMPSHIRE) in 1998 to fly Chinook and Puma helicopters. It is of course just my opinion, but, the methods (if any method is actually employed?) of the RAF in allotting Squadron numbers really does appear probably one of the most mysterious activities ever devised in the history of mankind. Is it possible they employ people such as soothsayers, Druids, clairvoyants and similar in these proceedings?
GORIS Jef
This comment was written on: 2020-03-02 13:33:20Hello, is there a photo available of the airfield (airmap) off Scampton it had concrete airways, i mean grasslandings. Can you help please
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